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Ethiopian–Egyptian relations have seen remarkable ten-
sion since Ethiopia began the Renaissance Dam construc-
tion in 2011, and tensions have since escalated when Ethi-
opia announced the filling stage. While Ethiopia defends 
its project due to its economic importance, Egypt fears its 
negative effects.
The paper discusses the hydro-political differences be-
tween the Nile Basin countries, particularly Egypt and 
Ethiopia, regarding the issue of water sharing and the 
means of settling it. It also discusses the consequent dip-
lomatic problems and changes in the balance of power in 
Africa with the rise of Ethiopia as a regional power. The 
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paper has found that the worsening of the Nile Basin situ-
ation is a result of the persistence of the conflicting parties 
and their adherence to their positions with no willingness 
to make concessions. Given the lack of a comprehensive 
legal agreement to regulate the exploitation and sharing 
of Nile water, the only way to put an end to this conflict is 
through cooperation between all basin countries.
Keywords: Renaissance Dam, Nile Basin, Nile Water Agree-
ments, acquired rights, water security
1. Introduction
Each crisis represents an opportunity to test hypotheses, and thus the Re-
naissance Dam crisis constitutes an opportunity for Egypt and Ethiopia 
to test their diplomatic strengths and their allies’ position at all levels, as 
well as to reformulate their external relationship on the right foundations.
The Renaissance Dam has been viewed as either having no negative im-
pact on downstream countries or as an unprecedented existential threat. 
The former view results from shortcomings in problem assessment, na-
mely from ignoring its strategic dimensions, while the latter view is due 
to a combination of the main problem (dam construction) and its current 
mismanagement repercussions. This requires adjustment and distinction: 
to be aware of the extent of the damage and of potential solutions.
The East Nile Basin crisis is considered part of the larger Nile River crisis 
over issues related to dam construction and the share of water. Despite 
an attempt to reach agreement within the framework of previous interna-
tional agreements, an escalation of this crisis has been brought about by 
increasing population density and renewed demands aimed at economic 
development on the one hand, and the weak nature of these agreements 
and the questioning of their authenticity and legal obligations on the other.
The Renaissance Dam is a specialised water project for electric power ge-
neration and agricultural development which Ethiopia has been building 
since April 2011, as part of its plan to take advantage of its water resour-
ces in the East Nile Basin. In view of its magnitude, the project has been 
met with widespread controversy by downstream countries (Egypt and 
Sudan), who have claimed that it threatens their water security and poses 
a great danger towards them.
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Some politicians have seen that challenges faced by Nile Basin countries, 
namely instability and economic problems, affect the relations between 
them. Although this appears to be a conflict over water, the conflict in the 
Nile Basin region is more likely to be a political struggle linked to a re-
drawing of the map of powers in Africa. Therefore, this topic has different 
dimensions at the international and regional level in addition to its legal, 
economic, political, and environmental dimensions.
The Ethiopian vision of issues regarding development, existence, influen-
ce, and national pride is a starting point for its position on Nile water use 
because Ethiopia is among the poorest countries in terms of development 
indicators. On the other hand, Egypt bases its position on the theory of 
territorial unity, which gives downstream countries the right to reject pro-
jects that upper watercourse countries want to undertake to develop their 
water resources, if these projects affect water revenue that reaches down-
stream countries (Khalid, 2007, p. 33).
It also seems that the 1929 Nile Water Agreement was based on the abso-
lute territorial unity theory, whereby Britain recognised Egypt’s natural 
and historical rights to Nile water and agreed to Egypt’s approval as a 
condition for undertaking projects on the Nile. Consequently, this was a 
major reason for Ethiopia’s refusal to negotiate with Egypt, as Ethiopia 
believes that what Egypt calls a historical and natural right to Nile water 
is the result of a colonial agreement made at a time when basin countries 
did not have the authority to make decisions. In this regard, Ethiopia has 
been supported by most of the Nile Basin countries, which have confir-
med their non-recognition of prior agreements between Sudan and Egypt 
in light of the fact that these agreements were not entirely fair to Sudan 
and that Sudan’s share was 18.5 billion m3 compared to Egypt’s 55.5 billi-
on m3 (Hamad, 2014, p. 47).
Consequently, this paper aims to discuss the dimensions of the crisis and 
raises some key questions, including the question of how Egypt, Sudan, 
and Ethiopia are dealing with the Renaissance Dam project. What initia-
tives have been taken to resolve the dispute? Why has the crisis become 
complicated and difficult to resolve between Egypt and Ethiopia in par-
ticular? Is the dispute over the Renaissance Dam a dispute over water or 
over the balance of power? Are there any options available to resolve the 
crisis?
The paper tries to verify a number of hypotheses in this regard, including 
(1) that the dispute over the Renaissance Dam is an indication of a shift 
in the balance and dynamics of power in Africa, (2) that the Renaissance 
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Dam crisis has clarified the shortcomings in creating a legal framework for 
water distribution and the need to find a fair agreement to manage Nile 
water, and (3) that the dispute over Nile water could only be resolved by 
cooperation between all the Nile Basin countries as they undertake de-
velopment projects that would strengthen relations and lead to achieving 
sustainable development within the framework of mutual benefits.
The researcher has used the historical method to study Nile water pro-
blems throughout history by referring to reasons for the outbreak of the 
crisis, the legal approach to addressing prior agreements between Nile 
Basin countries, and an analysis of the stance of both upstream and down-
stream countries regarding these agreements. The paper has also used 
the descriptive analytical approach to collect information regarding the 
Renaissance Dam crisis, to analyse it, to explain the current situation, the 
determine the conditions and relationships between variables and events, 
and to draw conclusions. The case study approach was also used in addre-
ssing the Renaissance Dam crisis, its history, the various stages it has 
passed through, and its impact on the future of relations between the Nile 
Basin countries and in analysing the dimensions associated with the con-
struction of the dam and the balance of power in the Nile Basin region.
The researcher has also relied on the international system approach, 
which is based on the fact that international politics arises and develops 
within the framework of a specific international system and stems from 
its main constituent elements, namely, actors, structure, institutions, and 
operations. Therefore, analysing international politics at a specific histo-
rical stage requires us to identify those elements and how they interact 
(Salim, 2002, pp. 11–23).
This analytical framework allows us to learn about political dynamics and 
understand laws that govern its movement, as well as to track the course 
of the interactions between the regional and the international system and 
its external environment, and identify the possible impact on the constitu-
ent elements of the system and on its external environment (Naffa, 2014, 
pp. 219–224).
The importance of using this approach should be viewed in light of signifi-
cant regional and international transformations that the Nile Basin region 
has witnessed and their implications on various issues, including the topic 
of water in general and the Renaissance Dam in particular.
The researcher has also relied on game theory, which is a method of stu-
dying decision-making in conflict situations when the best behaviour of 
each party depends on its ability to anticipate what the other party will 
533























do. Within the framework of this study, it is possible to follow this theory, 
but setting aside its zero-sum game aspect in which one side wins and the 
other loses and focussing instead on a relative match in which both sides 
win without resorting to a conflict. Therefore, instead of the Renaissance 
Dam being a focus of the conflict, it turns into a hub for cooperation 
between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. These theories may be central in 
the negotiations between the three countries, which we will try to clarify 
through the study.
2.  General Background on the Nile Basin 
The Nile River is the longest river in the world, with a length of 6,722 km 
starting from Lake Victoria (Taha, 2005, p. 17), and the Nile Basin inclu-
des all the countries where its tributaries are located and the countries 
through which it flows and which benefit from its waters (Bashir, 1974, 
p. 396). These include Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Kenya, Eritrea, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Repu-
blic of Congo, which cover a total area of about 3 million km2 (or 10% of 
African territory) (Sharagi, 2013, p. 5).
The Nile draws its resources from several sources. The first of these is the 
Equatorial Lakes Plateau from which the longest tributary of the Nile 
stems (the White Nile), and its sources flow from Lakes Victoria and Al-
bert, which is equivalent to 15% of the river’s revenue. The second is the 
Ethiopian Plateau which is one the most important sources of the Nile, as 
it supplies it with more than 71 billion m3 of water (about 85% of its ave-
rage annual water supply). The water flows into its main course through 
three tributaries that originate from the volcanic foothills zone: the Blue 
Nile, whose average annual discharge is 50 billion m3 or so and consti-
tutes 60% of the river’s revenue; the Sobat River with an average annual 
discharge of 13.5 billion m3; and the Atbara River with an average annual 
discharge of 10.5 billion m3 (Abbas, 2021). The Bahr al-Ghazal Basin is 
the third main source of Nile and it originates from southern Sudan at the 
border with the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African 
Republic as a group of small rivers whose average annual revenue is about 
15 billion m3, but they feed the Blue Nile River with only about 500 milli-
on m3, as it loses the greater part of its water in the swampy area.
The rivers of Bahr al-Ghazal, Bahr al-Zaraf, Bahr al-Arab, Bahr al-Jabal, 
and the Sobat River meet with the White Nile River south of the city of 
534





Malakal in southern Sudan, forming the main course of the river. The 
Blue Nile and the White Nile meet at the city of Khartoum to the north of 
the Sudanese capital, passing through Egyptian lands and flowing into the 
Mediterranean Sea in two branches: Damietta and Rasheed (Hamdan, 
2015, pp. 281–284).
3. The Water Situation and Determinants of 
Conflict Between the Nile Basin Countries
Some regions of the world are affected by water shortages more than 
others, especially Latin America, southern and northern Africa, and the 
Middle East. For these reasons, conflicts over water are intensifying 
(Allan, 2002). In this context, a large number of regional disputes arise 
over the control of water resources, particularly given the absence of legal 
frameworks and regional and international institutions that have the abi-
lity to solve them (Shiva, 2002). This is evident in the Renaissance Dam 
crisis.
The water problem in the Nile Basin countries stems from the fact that 
these countries are likely to suffer from future risks as a result of wa-
ter shortages, especially the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan, 
which depend almost entirely on Nile water. Egypt is the most populous 
country and the most dependent on Nile water; rain is almost non-existent 
there and the groundwater is not renewable. Hence Nile water represents 
about 97% of Egypt’s water resources. Egypt’s share of Nile water is 55.5 
billion m3, while the country has 3.6 million acres of cultivated land, which 
means that this amount of water is not sufficient for the needs of the 
population. In order for Egypt to maintain its per capita share of water, 
which is less than 600 m3, it needs about 77 billion m3, which means it is 
running a deficit of 22 billion m3 (Abbas, 2021).
Although Sudan has rain agriculture, the irrigated sector depends on the 
water flowing from the Ethiopian Plateau. The area of irrigated agricul-
ture in Sudan is 2,449 million acres and the state plans to increase the 
irrigated area to 6,892 million acres. However, the lack of infrastructure is 
the biggest obstacle, in addition to the low storage capacity of the Sennar, 
the Roseires and the Khasm el-Girba Reservoirs, which is 3.2 billion m3 in 
total or equivalent to 27% of Sudan’s share of Nile water (Khalid, 2015, 
p. 29). On the other hand, the storage capacity of the Aswan High Dam 
in Egypt is 62 billion m3, which shows the extent of Sudan’s weakness in 
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establishing the infrastructure to exploit its share of Nile water (Khalid, 
2015, p. 30) 
The total water resources available to Ethiopia amount to about 150 billi-
on m3, including 36 billion m3 of rainwater, 22 billion m3 of underground 
water, and 92 billion m3 of river water, including the River Nile. In spite 
of this, there is little benefit from it due to the nature of the mountainous 
and rugged terrain along riverbeds and a lack of flat plains (Sidira, 1994, 
pp. 282–284)
Since the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970, Egypt has not 
suffered from the dangers of floods as a result of the high capacity of the 
dam lake. On the contrary, floods in Ethiopia and Sudan are frequent 
and more dangerous than in the rest of the upstream countries. The two 
countries also suffer from the alternation and recurrence of floods and 
droughts, both of which have repercussions. For example, in 1998 high 
floods and torrential rains prevailed in both Sudan and Ethiopia, affecting 
about 14 million people in the two countries. In 2000 droughts and a lack 
of rainfall affected about 16 million people (Noureldin, 2011, pp. 52–53).
It should be noted that four of the Nile Basin countries (Kenya, Burundi, 
Egypt, and Rwanda ) have already entered the stage of relative scarcity of 
water, with an average per capita share of about 235, 254, 570, and 902 
m3 respectively (Najjar, 2010, pp. 227–228). The picture will grow bleaker 
by 2050, when the per capita share of water will drop to 123, 189, 290, 
502, 522, 834, and 915 m3 annually in Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda respectively, leading to demands for an 
increase in their Nile water shares, which in turn means more conflict 
(Adayleh, 2005, pp.173–174).
The Nile Basin countries are also suffering from an increase in populati-
on numbers and food crises resulting from civil wars, drought, and high 
poverty rates, in addition to the regional imbalance in the distribution of 
water resources. The Food and Agriculture Organization has been mo-
nitoring seven of the Nile Basin countries – namely, Eritrea, Burundi, 
Democratic Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda – as part of 
36 countries around the globe which are facing a food crisis. These fac-
tors have come to interact, leading to the emergence of an international 
water conflict between downstream countries suffering from water shor-
tage and upstream countries with an abundance of water but economic 
structures that are too weak to exploit it (Nawara & Mukhtar, 2018, pp. 
36–38). This has led to their reliance on grants and foreign loans, which 
has increased their political dependence and affected their relations with 
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neighbouring countries. Most of these countries live in regional conflicts 
over water security and internal conflicts due to subjective factors and 
external motives (Khairallah, 2016, pp. 31–34).
The legal situation has also contributed to creating a suitable environment 
for water disputes in the Nile Basin, as all Nile water legal agreements are 
bilateral or tripartite agreements that either do not receive the approval 
of other basin countries or are not recognised by member states because 
they were signed in the colonial era. This legal situation has resulted in 
the regional hydraulic system of the Nile Basin lacking any comprehen-
sive legal or institutional framework acceptable to the various Nile states 
(Tayeh, 2012).
In terms of politics, the water problem in the Nile Basin is often linked 
to political conditions such as political instability, border disputes, and 
civil wars, as well as to the nature of the political relations between the 
Nile Basin countries and the political transformations taking place in the 
region (Oashrin, 2017, pp. 118–120).
Armed fighting operations within many of the Nile Basin countries have 
resulted in the perpetuation of the political instability of the existing regi-
mes in these countries. Among the most dangerous wars in the region is 
the civil war in both South Sudan and the Darfur region, and the armed 
conflicts between government forces and opposition groups in Rwanda, 
Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan, which 
has known a civil war, raised the issue of water in the 1959 agreement re-
gulating the use of Nile water. The first phase of the civil war in southern 
Sudan began in 1955 and ended with a peaceful settlement under the 
Addis Ababa Agreement in 1976. Then war began again in 1983 after 
military rebellion and political turmoil, eventually leading to the secession 
of the south from the north in 2011 (Daas, 2015, p. 34).
Political instability in the region led to the failure to complete the Jonglei 
Canal project, which was scheduled to be 360 km long and as important 
as the Egyptian Suez Canal. This led to Sudan and Egypt losing 4 billion 
m3 of water. (Hassan, 2016, p. 48)
What is clear is the link between natural resources, development needs, 
and regional and international conflicts in the Nile Basin. It is also evident 
that the main reason for conflicts and disputes likely to take place in the 
region in the near future will be control over water resources and access to 
water, as can be observed by the ongoing crisis between Egypt and Sudan 
on the one side and Ethiopia on the other, due to its construction of the 
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Renaissance Dam and the failure to reach a settlement between the two 
parties regarding the rules governing the filling of the dam.
4. Nile Water Agreements
In light of the existing hydro-political disputes between upstream and 
downstream countries and the consequent diplomatic problems between 
Nile Basin countries, in particular Egypt and Ethiopia, the positions of 
the two countries have become sharply polarised as their views on issues 
of water sharing and ways of settling these issues diverged. 
In this context, the 1929 agreement between Egypt and Britain and the 
1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan are of particular importance, 
as the first obligated the source countries not to carry out any water pro-
jects on the river course without Egypt’s approval and granted this coun-
try the right to veto any project which would affect the level of the Nile 
when it reached Egypt (Odeh, 1998, p. 23).
When it had gained independence, Sudan objected to the 1929 agreement 
and Egypt had to renegotiate it under new terms because it needed to bu-
ild the Aswan High Dam. The 1959 agreement included Sudan’s approval 
for Egypt to build the Aswan High Dam in exchange for Egypt’s approval 
of the construction of two Sudanese dams in Rosaries on the Blue Nile 
and in Khashm el-Girba on the Atbara River (Odeh, 1998, p. 24).
Although the 1959 agreement increased Sudan’s share of water from 4 
billion to 18.5 billion m3, this does not indicate distribution fairness be-
cause this share is equal to only one third of Egypt’s share of 55.5 billion 
m3. In spite of this, Egypt takes 1.5 billion m3 from Sudan annually. The 
1929 agreement indicated clearly that disputes arising from the interpre-
tation of any of the agreement provisions were to be resolved by resorting 
to an independent arbitration body, if the two countries failed to resolve 
them on their own. This, however, is not indicated in the 1959 agreement. 
(Ahmed, 2011, p. 421).
Perhaps the most important clause of the agreement from a political point 
of view is included within the general provisions clause, i.e., that the two 
countries must take a unified position if the need arises for negotiations 
over Nile water with other countries. This was in the interest of Egypt, 
which has benefited politically, economically, and socially from these 
agreements. On the contrary, Sudan failed to preserve its rights when it 
signed the 1929 and 1959 agreements. The 1959 agreement led to the 
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submerging of 150 km3 of Sudanese lands in the Aswan Dam Lake, and 
the displacement of about 50,000 people, all of which was made without 
any valuable compensation. (Rubaie, 2001, p.111). 
In 1957 Ethiopia sent notes to Egypt and Sudan, expressing its earlier po-
sition and indicating its need for development projects, asking for rights 
to Nile water within its territory. When Ethiopia did not receive a respon-
se, it decided to start its projects on the Blue Nile, indicating that Egypt 
had constructed the High Dam without consulting the rest of the basin 
countries, despite the fact that international law requires any country that 
intends to undertake such major construction projects to notify the ripa-
rian countries in advance and consult them. Consequently, Ethiopia did 
not consider itself bound by any agreement in this field. This was later 
revealed at a water conference in Argentina in 1977, when the Ethiopi-
an delegation expressed their denial of any international agreement and 
claimed that in the absence of an international treaty between the course 
countries any country has the right to proceed with water resource deve-
lopment within its region (Sharrouf, 2011, p. 297).
The essence of the crisis between the Nile Basin countries lies in the right 
of all countries to benefit from their water resources without recognising 
prior Nile agreements. Now upstream countries – specifically Ethiopia, 
which controls 85% of the river’s water – are calling for a need to review 
previous treaties and the Nile water quota system between upstream and 
downstream countries, and to find a new regional coordination initiative 
(Othman et al., 2014, p. 126).
These demands laid the groundwork for the Nile Basin Countries’ Coo-
peration Framework Agreement in 2010, known as the Entebbe Agree-
ment and signed by six countries: Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Kenya, and Burundi, but not Sudan and Egypt. The agreement adopted 
a set of principles for the use, development, and protection of the Nile 
Basin, including mutual cooperation, sustainable development, equitable 
and reasonable use, and the obligation not to cause significant harm to 
other basin countries and to resolve disputes peacefully. The agreement 
created a commission whereby all Nile River countries could exchange 
information and discuss joint national projects. 
The Ethiopian condition for joining this regional cooperation project was 
that the project include the preparation of a framework agreement that 
would outline the general principles for the organisation of Nile water and 
establish the Nile Basin Commission to supervise cooperation between 
basin countries. It was agreed that the framework agreement would be a 
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component of the Nile Basin Initiative (Alam, 2014, p. 77). The Entebbe 
Agreement represents a legal framework that focuses on the interests of 
upstream countries because it abolishes all prior Nile agreements, and 
the author believes that this was the reason Sudan and Egypt refused to 
sign it.
In August 2014 in Khartoum, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia agreed to form 
a committee of national experts to study the Renaissance Dam, and at 
the conclusion of its preparatory meetings on February 3, 2015, the com-
mittee reached a number of understandings, including the need to sepa-
rate political from technical issues in dam negotiations through high com-
mittees. The efforts culminated in Khartoum on March 23, 2015, with 
the signing of a Declaration of Principles that outlines the obligations of 
the three countries to reach full agreement with regard to the results of 
filling the reservoir and its annual operation. However, Ethiopia rejected 
Egypt’s request to stop working on the dam until the studies of the nati-
onal expert committee were completed, noting that their report did not 
recommend that dam construction be stopped. (Behairi, 2016, p. 548).
When Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan signed this agreement, this also raised 
questions regarding the Entebbe Agreement, especially because Cairo 
and Khartoum have reservations about “not stipulating the fair and equi-
table use of resources, including heavy rains and groundwater, which are 
considered as sources of fresh water”. Despite these reservations, Egypt 
and Sudan have signed the Declaration of Principles with Addis Ababa, 
which revolves around Nile water division but does not mention resources 
(Sharrouf, 2011, p. 297). The implicit assumption of the new agreement 
is based on the immutable fact that the Nile is a shared resource whose 
optimisation requires mutual understanding, new trust, and a flexible spi-
rit of cooperation (Nour, 2015, p. 25). This agreement was accepted by 
Egypt and Sudan and allowed them to view the Renaissance Dam as an 
Ethiopian project that would contribute to economic development in the 
country, as long as the three countries decided to fill the dam based on the 
results of the study prepared by the Joint Tripartite Commission, which 
represented a big positive change at that time.
Consequently, the agreement ended the state of Egyptian–Sudanese con-
fusion regarding the Renaissance Dam and made it clear that they had 
accepted its construction. The three countries agreed to undertake two 
studies: one regarding water resources and a simulation model of a hydro-
electric system, while the other was to assess the environmental, social, 
and economic impact of the dam on Sudan and Egypt. In April 2015, the 
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three countries chose the French expert (BRL Group) and the Dutch 
institute (Deltares) to carry out the two studies but disputes quickly emer-
ged between the three parties. This prompted Deltares to withdraw from 
the preparation programme for the two studies at the end of October 
2015 and conflicts between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Renaissance 
Dam resumed.
Although the Declaration of Principles contained important provisions, 
from a substantive point of view it did not address the fundamental issue 
of Nile water sharing nor did it obligate Ethiopia to reconsider the size of 
the dam or the capacity of the reservoir that exceeded Ethiopia’s earlier 
plans. Because the document is only a declaration of principles, judging 
the extent of its success in reducing the disputes between Egypt and Et-
hiopia and the potential negative impacts of the project depends on the 
conversion of this document into technical agreements regarding the ope-
ration of the dam, as well as their actual implementation.
However, the speed at which Ethiopia proceeded with a project of such 
magnitude, without completing some of the studies, especially those re-
lated to the impact of the project on downstream countries, has raised 
many questions. Some experts have raised doubts regarding the econo-
mic viability of the project, indicating that the design was based on flood 
seasons and that its actual production would be about 30% of what was 
expected. This indicates that there are several technical and economic 
doubts regarding the project, which raises the question of whether its 
main objective is to generate energy or store water to control the Nile 
water flow, particularly in light of the fact that 59% of the water comes to 
Egypt from the Blue Nile Basin. This illustrates the extreme importance 
the Blue Nile water holds for both Egypt and Sudan (Noureldin, 2014, p. 
369). This line of thinking is supported by the controversy that has been 
created over the construction site of the dam, which indicates that if the 
goal was to produce energy as proclaimed, then the site of the dam is not 
the best choice Ethiopia could have made and the optimal location would 
be near the Tsisat Waterfalls or at the end of the Blue Nile Gorge. Loo-
king at the site chosen for the dam, it is near the Sudanese border and it 
is clear that it was carefully and intelligently chosen, regardless of whether 
the choice was entirely on part of Ethiopia or the result of a foreign con-
sultation. Here it is worth noting a study conducted between 1959 and 
1964 by US government experts, which proposed 33 places to construct 
dams. The largest of these was near the Sudanese border, which is also 
the current location of the Renaissance Dam (Riyad, 2014, pp. 154–155).
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Negotiations and meetings between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan regar-
ding the Renaissance Dam crisis have passed through many stages. One 
of the most prominent is the American mediation, which was led by the 
US Department of Treasury, when the foreign ministers of Egypt, Ethi-
opia, and Sudan, as well as the World Bank, were invited to participate. 
This was on October 31, 2019, after an Egyptian request for internatio-
nal mediation in the negotiations. Negotiation sessions were launched in 
November 2019 and lasted for 4 months without yielding tangible results. 
They ended with Ethiopia’s refusal to sign the agreement proposal pre-
sented by the United States and with its absence from the last round of 
negotiations that were held in Washington on February 27 and 28, 2020. 
Egypt signed the agreement proposal but Sudan did not.
In June 2020, Egypt also submitted a request to the UN Security Council 
to consider the issue of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam within the fra-
mework of an agenda item entitled “Peace and Security in Africa”. It then 
turned to the League of Arab States and was able to obtain a resolution 
of solidarity with the request in an extraordinary session held on June 23, 
2020, stressing the need for Ethiopia to refrain from starting to fill the 
dam reservoir without reaching an agreement with the two downstream 
countries on the rules for filling and operating the dam, as this procedu-
re represents an explicit violation of the 2015 Declaration of Principles 
agreement. (League of Arab States, 2020).
In July 2020, the three countries resumed negotiations under the auspices 
of the African Union. The first round of negotiations was also concluded 
without reaching a consensual solution and this coincided with the initial 
filling of the dam by Ethiopia, followed by a mini-African summit held 
on July 21, 2020, which called for continued negotiations and sought to 
formulate a binding legal agreement on the rules for filling and operating 
the Renaissance Dam. 
On August 28, 2020, another round of negotiations ended without con-
sensus on a draft agreement which was supposed to be submitted to the 
Presidency of the African Union. The three countries decided that each 
country would send a separate report to the Presidency of the African 
Union and they have since been unable to reach a peaceful and lasting 
settlement.
The dispute between downstream and upstream countries revolves around 
two main points. The first of these is the concept of water security, which 
Egypt and Uganda succeeded in including in Article 14 of the agreement 
as a way of reconciling the opposing positions between the source coun-
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tries and the two downstream countries regarding existing agreements 
(Ahmed, 2000, pp. 7–16). The second is the principle of acquired histo-
rical rights, to which the downstream states have adhered but the source 
countries have rejected, focussing instead on the principle of equitable 
and reasonable use of water (Ibrahim, 2013, p. 38). 
The source countries’ position is based on two legal theories. The first 
is the coercion theory, meaning that these countries did not sign these 
agreements as independent parties. The second is the theory of changing 
circumstances, meaning that the conditions of these countries and their 
needs after independence require that these unfair agreements be chan-
ged (Manzili, 2012, p. 221). Egypt relied on this theory when concluding 
the 1956 agreement. Sudan was not party to the 1929 agreement, as it 
was under colonial control and Britain signed on its behalf, while the 1959 
agreement was signed at a time when Sudan was newly independent and 
lacked the necessary legal and technical expertise. 
To prove the validity of prior agreements, Egypt relies on the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties of 1978, which 
considers stipulations of international agreements regarding the use of 
international rivers and waterways, the establishment of borders, and the 
termination of treaties to be matters that must be complied with (Abdelal, 
2013, p. 73). Art. 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Tre-
aties also stipulates that if a treaty has been used to establish a border, it 
is not permissible to invoke a fundamental change in circumstances as a 
reason for ending the treaty or withdrawing from it. Accordingly, it is not 
permissible for states after independence – like the Nile Basin countries 
and hence Ethiopia – to end the treaties due to a fundamental change in 
circumstances (Anani, 1997, p. 57).
In addition, the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 15, 1902 was signed by 
Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and the British government (on behalf of 
Egypt and Sudan). Ethiopia was not a colony at the time. Art. 3. of this 
treaty stipulates that the Ethiopian emperor shall not undertake any work 
on the Blue Nile that would affect Nile water flow, except in agreement 
with the British government (Amin, 2012, p. 48).
Disputes between basin countries like those described are what prompted 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to refuse 
to finance the Renaissance Dam project. The bank refuses to fund such 
projects unless they are carried out in full cooperation of all the countries 
concerned and with prior notification by the project owner, which Ethio-
pia did not provide when starting the dam (Rashidi, 2013, p. 479).
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5. Potential Impacts of the Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam on Egypt and Sudan
While Ethiopia has developed many ambitious plans to undertake pro-
jects to generate hydroelectric power and make the most of arable land 
by means of irrigation, Egyptian and Sudanese concerns are about the 
extent to which these Ethiopian projects may affect their water security 
and share of Nile water.
In general, estimates indicate that Egypt and Sudan will lose about 14 to 
24 billion m3, as suggested by the dam’s dead storage capacity. They will 
also lose the water that will leak through the reservoir rocks, whose quan-
tities have not been estimated yet. Water evaporation losses will increase 
by 5.9%, thereby increasing sedimentation rates (El-Nashar & Elyamany, 
2018, pp. 2384-2385). Cultivation of 29.47% and 23.03% of agricultural 
lands in Upper Egypt and the Delta region respectively may cease, and 
cultivated land with inundated and pond irrigation in Egypt and Sudan 
will decrease. Sudan, in particular, will lose the annual incoming clay that 
fertilises its agricultural lands around the Blue Nile. The level of Lake Na-
sser will be reduced by about 10 metres, which will affect electric power 
generation rates from the high dam, possibly reducing them by as much 
as 20% to 40%. Sudan will be affected by potential seismic waves due to 
the large quantities of water that will be stored near its southern border. If 
the dam collapses – as some experts expect due to the geological nature of 
Ethiopian lands – Sudanese and Egyptian lands will be flooded (Behairi, 
2016, pp. 503–510).
The dam has negative effects on Ethiopia as well. These are the following: 
high cost, estimated at 4.8 billion dollars and expected to reach 8 billion 
dollars; the flooding of about half a million acres of forest land and irriga-
ble agricultural land that is rare in the Blue Nile Basin in order to form the 
dam lake; sinking some mining areas rich in important minerals; and dis-
placing some citizens of the Lakes Region. Finally, the life of the dam has 
been shortened by 25–50 years due to silting. (Madani, 2017, pp. 59–60).
The major benefits of the Renaissance Dam are as follows: the production 
of 5250 MW of hydroelectric power, increasing fish wealth in Ethiopia, 
managing floods in Sudan, storing Blue Nile silt which helps to extend the 
life of the Sudanese dams and the High Dam, and the lack of evaporation 
due to the dam’s location at a height of about 570–650 meters above sea 
level (Sharagi, 2018, p. 28). 
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6. Eastern Nile Basin Countries’ Positions on the 
Renaissance Dam
6.1. Ethiopian Position on the Renaissance Dam
The dam project is part of an economic vision of generating electric energy 
and exporting it to African countries in order to achieve the economic be-
nefits of high growth rates. It affirms that the national water interest of 
Ethiopia to use its water rights is not subject to Egyptian and Sudanese 
approval (Agili, 2012, p. 186). Undertaking such a project, Ethiopia has 
fulfilled its old dream of exploiting the Nile and challenging Egyptian 
hegemony.
The Ethiopian position is based on how it views the 1929 and 1959 agree-
ments that simultaneously enabled Egypt to benefit from building dams 
for development and deprived other basin countries. Therefore, Egypt 
and Sudan should negotiate a new agreement stipulating that all basin co-
untries benefit from Nile resources in a fair way and in a manner that also 
respects the rights of downstream countries, in accordance with internati-
onal laws that provide for mutual benefit. From this perspective Ethiopia 
considers the construction of the Renaissance Dam for the purposes of 
generating necessary electric energy to be a legitimate matter that Egypt 
and Sudan can benefit from as well.
6.2. Egyptian Position on the Renaissance Dam
The thing that most affects the Egyptian position is that all the Nile coun-
tries except Sudan refuse to recognise the international inheritance prin-
ciple (Khalid, 2007, p. 249). Egypt has tried to explore legal options by 
focussing on agreements that determine its share of Nile water, as well as 
to define ways to reach agreement as it would be reached on any develo-
ping project. However, successive developments in regional and interna-
tional arenas have confirmed that this is not sufficient, as the presence of 
parties and forces that are ready to cooperate with Nile Basin countries, 
unilaterally or collectively, and the varied interests of the riparian states 
on the Nile River came as a major challenge to basin countries. 
The Egyptians went through several stages in dealing with the crisis, inclu-
ding the impact of political changes that have been witnessed since the 
25 January Revolution in 2011, when Egypt headed for a crisis.  It was 
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agreed to use diplomatic means and form an international committee of 
experts to discuss the project and submit reports, bearing in mind that the 
international committee did not start its work until May 2012.
When Ethiopia diverted the Blue Nile course on May 28, 2013, Egypt 
started the escalation phase, but the political changes in Egypt in July 
2013 prevented the country from focussing on this topic. With a certain 
delay, Egypt announced the reasons for its position on the dam in a docu-
ment published on Egyptian Foreign Ministry website, which referred 
to legal foundations, including historical Nile water agreements and the 
agreement signed by Egypt and Ethiopia in 1993, which included the 
commitment of the two countries not to take any action that would cause 
extreme harm to the other. It also referred to legal rules for prior notifica-
tion of projects on international rivers. Furthermore, specialised national 
councils prepared a report to present the issue to the United Nations 
General Assembly as an issue affecting regional peace and security, es-
pecially because a direct resort to international arbitration is not possible 
due to the need for the parties to agree to it (Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014). 
At the same time, Egypt did not close the door to negotiations over the 
dam, which were likely to stumble once they had been resumed because 
of differing points of view regarding the criteria for selecting the internati-
onal companies to be entrusted with carrying out the studies recommen-
ded by the international committee of experts. These attempts ended with 
the signing of the Declaration of Principles on the Renaissance Dam on 
23 March 2015 (Berhane, 2014).
6.3. Sudanese Position on the Renaissance Dam
Since the beginning the Sudanese position has been one of moderation 
and diplomacy, although in general it is somewhat similar to that of other 
basin countries, especially with regard to the legitimacy of the agreements 
related to the Nile. On 12 December 2013 Sudan formally announced 
its support for the Renaissance Dam as an issue of development and 
common interest, not politics. The Sudanese government believes that 
the Egyptian government should perceive the issue as a technical and not 
a political one. Although it agreed to the Renaissance Dam, Sudan did not 
sign the Entebbe Agreement because there was no agreement on some 
of the outstanding issues, and Sudan’s steadfast position was to continue 
to cooperate on Nile Basin issues regardless of the framework agreement, 
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which Sudan considers a means of cooperation and not a goal in itself. On 
the other hand, Egypt believes that because Sudan is under a transitional 
government, it has not yet developed its final position on the dam. It is 
clear that the political changes which Sudan has been witnessing since the 
end of 2018 are beginning to have repercussions on Sudan’s foreign relati-
ons, primarily those with Ethiopia, which played a direct role in the recent 
Sudanese reconciliation between the Military Council and the Freedom 
and Change Forces.
It is possible to understand the Sudanese position on the Renaissance 
Dam by analysing the current state of Sudanese relations – after the revo-
lution – with both Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt’s ambivalent position towar-
ds the Sudanese revolution has also raised questions, as Egypt, which 
declared war on the Muslim Brotherhood, is at the same time against the 
popular revolution in Sudan that excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from 
ruling. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia has benefited from the intense identity stru-
ggle within Sudan between Afrikaans and Arabism, which Egypt was una-
ble to understand.
Many Sudanese observers believe that the Egyptian fear of building the 
Renaissance Dam is the fear of losing the use of the water loan that comes 
from Sudan (1.5 billion m3), in addition to the percentage of water that 
Sudan is failing to use, especially with the Sudanese Minister of Irrigation 
and Water Resources’ announcement in August 2011 that the extent of 
his country’s consumption is about 12 billion m3 and that Sudan has a 
plan to fully exploit its share of water. Such an announcement may not 
seem unusual, but if it comes only four months after Ethiopia announces 
the construction of the Renaissance Dam, then this may be an implicit 
message to the Egyptian side that the amount of 6.5 billion m3 coming to 
it may stop (Badawi, 2018).
The shift in the Sudanese position and its desire to fully exploit its share 
can be linked to the secession of South Sudan and the establishment of 
the state of South Sudan, which, like other basin countries, is demanding 
its share of Nile water. The amount of water coming to Sudan will be con-
trolled by two countries instead of one (Ethiopia and South Sudan) and 
this will constitute a threat to Sudanese water security. The effects will be 
felt in the fields of economy and development, especially because Sudan 
is still suffering from the economic consequences of the secession of the 
south when it comes to oil revenues.
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It should be noted that the state of South Sudan does not need Nile River 
water, due to the presence of other rivers and heavy rainfall. However, the 
Egyptians’ fear stems from the Entebbe Agreement, which stipulates the 
necessity of redistributing water quotas to the basin countries according 
to new regional developments. South Sudan is important to Sudan and 
Egypt because it is the ideal location for projects to increase the share 
of water, whether by storage or by building canals, such as the Jonglei 
Canal project, which would increase the revenues of Nile water and the 
subsequent generation of electricity.
According to expert figures, the most important pool of Nile water in the 
state of South Sudan is in the Bahr al-Ghazal region, where it receives 540 
billion m3 of water annually. The south controls the entire water revenue 
from the Equatorial Plateau, which is estimated at 29 billion m3 annually: 
15.5 billion m3 from White Nile tributaries and 18.5 billion m3 from So-
bat tributaries. The land in South Sudan is flat, allowing for high rates of 
water flow (Hassan, 2016, pp. 55–56). Thus the importance of South Su-
dan for Egypt is increasing because it enjoys an abundance of water that 
means it will not seek to reduce Cairo’s share of the Nile water passing 
through its lands, at least not under normal circumstances.
Despite the continuous assurances that the state of South Sudan is giving 
Egypt, always confirming that Egypt’s share of the Nile water will not be 
affected, proposing to mediate with Ethiopia to resolve the dispute over 
the re-division of the Nile water and the establishment of the Renais-
sance Dam, it is certain that the future water policy of South Sudan will 
be subject to calculations of gain and loss as well as some regional and 
international pressure, especially with the presence of clear coordination 
between South Sudan and Israel.
In the same context, Ethiopia and South Sudan are linked in the most 
important water basins that feed the Nile with water, and the White Nile 
Basin comes on top of it (Bashir, 2012, pp. 17–30). The establishment of 
the water-rich state of South Sudan has strengthened Ethiopia’s position 
vis-à-vis Sudan and Egypt regarding Nile water, especially as the south will 
not hesitate to support Ethiopia, which has often played a major role in 
securing the arming of the southern government and training the people’s 
army over the past three decades. This is in light of Juba’s continuous en-
deavour to extend strategic cooperation ties with Addis Ababa, realising 
the importance of Ethiopia as an important player in the Horn of Africa 
region (Nour, 2016, p. 33).
The Republic of South Sudan is currently in the process of building a 
state and although it does not need additional water resources, its need 
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lies in energy in the future. In light of its need for industrial projects, it is 
expected that South Sudan will work on building dams to generate hydro-
electric energy similar to the Renaissance Dam, based perhaps on Israeli 
support (Hamad, 2014, pp. 139–140).
It is now clear that the United States’ initiative has been a complete fa-
ilure and that there is a possibility that the crisis will continue without 
a solution for a long time, which harms Egypt’s negotiating position, as 
the construction of the dam seems to fundamentally change the balance 
of power in Africa. Adherence to ancient water treaties no longer gives 
Egypt any protection from restrictions imposed on its water supply. Also, 
it is not possible for Cairo to carry out its repeated threats to stop dam 
construction by military means if necessary, as Ethiopia has started the 
second filling stage.
So far, efforts to put pressure on Ethiopia through allied countries have 
failed, as the United States, Europe, as well as the Gulf States and China 
have good relations with the two countries, and they are clearly not ready 
to take sides in the water conflict. Ethiopian leadership is also unlikely 
to make a concession on its own, given that the project has taken on a 
national dimension. 
7. Conclusion
The undertaking of the Renaissance Dam project has been considered a 
“turning point” that is expected to change the balance of power in Africa. 
The decision to undertake construction reflected Ethiopian rise in the 
face of Egyptian retreat. The political instability of Egypt, the succession 
of different governments, and the lack of a clear and effective foreign po-
licy regarding this issue gave Ethiopia the chance to negotiate and com-
plete the project. Another contributing factor was the emergence of new 
funders such as China, who offered flexible terms, unlike the Nile Basin 
Fund or the World Bank, which requires the prior collective approval of 
all basin countries before providing funding.
Dealing with the Renaissance Dam crisis has included many challenges, 
the first of which is the absence of a comprehensive and binding legal 
agreement. In order to know the legal status of Renaissance Dam con-
struction, we must know the legal framework for sharing water in interna-
tional rivers. Unfortunately, there is no detailed agreement for Nile water 
sharing or each country’s proportion that would serve as a basic reference 
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for all participating countries in the Nile Basin in the case of any projects 
undertaken on the river basin. There is no agreement that would serve as 
a binding legal framework which countries could not disregard and which 
would eliminate conflict between Nile Basin countries. Upstream coun-
tries, led by Ethiopia, have begun to promote the importance of adopting 
new legal standards that go beyond the prevailing legal system inheri-
ted from the colonial era. Ethiopia objects strongly to acquired historical 
rights and prior notification principles. This shift in legal and institutional 
thinking has been associated with a similar shift in Ethiopian political 
discourse.
This takes us to the second challenge, which is the rise of Ethiopia as a 
regional power. The construction of the dam will allow Ethiopia to beco-
me a regional centre for the production of hydroelectric energy, and it will 
also enable it to control Nile water: a role that Egypt has been playing 
in the Nile Basin region for decades. However, instability in both Egypt 
and Sudan, as well as the secession of South Sudan, have led to the rise 
of Ethiopia. In addition, the availability of international funding from co-
untries such as China is helping Ethiopia and other Nile Basin countries 
challenge Egypt, which had previously relied on international donor insti-
tutions not to provide any financial transfers for projects built on the Nile 
before Egypt’s approval. All this is leading to changes in the balance of 
power in the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin. 
However, an analysis of the political conflict over water and the Renais-
sance Dam between the Nile Basin countries shows the important role 
of the strategy of surprise used to achieve better results. Because Ethi-
opian decision-makers realised that neither Egypt nor Sudan expected 
Ethiopia to start Renaissance Dam construction without notifying them 
beforehand, this in turn led Ethiopia to achieve counter-hegemony in the 
conflict. 
Therefore, it has become clear that Renaissance Dam crisis goes beyond 
the technical aspects, as it is mainly related to politics, ideology, the dyna-
mics of internal politics, and the issue of regional competition. The chall-
enging Ethiopian behaviour against Egypt could negatively affect Cairo’s 
influence in the Nile Basin and could encourage the rest of the upstream 
countries to undertake similar unilateral projects. Given this situation, the 
opportunities for political manoeuvring remain very limited and in light 
of the impotence of international intervention, whether by the Security 
Council or in the form of American mediation, regional initiatives from 
within the Nile Basin might be effective.
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The central problem is that countries focus on their national interests 
rather than cooperation. While national interests are not the only expla-
nation for the conflict, overcoming these is fundamental to cooperation. 
The mutual benefits emphasized by traditional calls for cooperation are 
still based on national benefits, thus helping to maintain the primacy of 
national interests and not adding to an understanding of how those bene-
fits are interrelated.
Accordingly, the next stage imposes the necessity of creating new mecha-
nisms to activate the cooperation between the Nile Basin countries within 
the framework of the win-win principle, which requires setting framewor-
ks for bilateral and collective dialogue between the basin countries with 
the aim of reaching a consensual solution that achieves fair and equitable 
use of the shared water resources. The three countries should adopt a 
two-step approach: they must build confidence by agreeing on the terms 
of how to fill the dam reservoir so that downstream countries are not 
harmed, and they should negotiate a cross-border framework for sharing 
resources in order to avoid future conflicts. This requires the possession of 
a new vision of what the Nile Basin region is witnessing in relation to the 
balance of power and regional and international interests.
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CONFLICTS IN THE NILE BASIN AND THE CHANGE OF POWER 
BALANCE: THE RENAISSANCE DAM CRISIS
Summary
In 2011, Ethiopia laid the foundation stone for the Great Ethiopian Renais-
sance Dam. The size of the dam, its timing and how it was planned have both 
sparked severe political disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia and inaugurated 
a new stage in the Nile Basin countries’ relations in general and Egypt, Sudan, 
and Ethiopia in particular. In April 2020, Ethiopia announced that it would 
continue to complete the dam’s first phase of filling. In response, Egypt sent a 
letter to the Security Council warning against the potential dangers of such 
a move, pointing out that the decision contradicts what was stipulated in the 
Declaration of Principles agreement that Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia signed 
in Khartoum in March 2015. However, Ethiopia replied that it saw no reason 
to delay filling the dam reservoir and challenges moved to another stage when 
Ethiopia refused to see through the Washington-led negotiations at the end of 
2019. Ethiopia was absent from the final agreement signed by Cairo on 28 
February 2020. Sudan was reserved. The position of both Egypt and Ethiopia 
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towards the Renaissance Dam issue draws attention to the changes of the power 
balance in Africa. 
Keywords: Renaissance Dam, Nile Basin, Nile Water Agreements, acquired 
rights, water security
SUKOBI U SLIVU NILA I PROMJENA RAVNOTEŽE MOĆI: KRIZA 
OKO RENESANSNE BRANE
Sažetak
Godine 2011. Etiopija je položila kamen temeljac za izgradnju Velike etiopske 
renesansne brane. Veličina brane, izbor trenutka njezine izgradnje i način na 
koji je planirana izazvali su ozbiljne političke prijepore između Egipta i Eti-
opije i u novu fazu uveli odnose između zemalja slijeva Nila, posebno Egipta, 
Sudana i Etiopije. U travnju 2020. Etiopija je najavila da nastavlja s prvom 
fazom punjenja brane. Kao odgovor na to, Egipat je uputio pismo Vijeću sigur-
nosti UN-a upozoravajući na potencijalne opasnosti takva poteza i ističući da 
je takva odluka u suprotnosti s odredbama Deklaracije o načelnom sporazumu 
koji su Egipat, Sudan i Etiopija potpisali u Khartoumu 15. ožujka 2015. Me-
đutim, Etiopija je replicirala da ne vidi razlog za odgodu punjenja brane te 
su izazovi eskalirali na novu razinu kad je Etiopija odbila potpisati pregovore 
u Washingtonu krajem 2019. te nije bila prisutna pri potpisivanju završnog 
sporazuma 28. veljače 2020. Pozicije Egipta i Etiopije u odnosu na problem 
Renesansne brane usmjeravaju pozornost prema promjenama u ravnoteži moći 
u Africi.
Ključne riječi: Renesansna brana, sliv Nila, vodni sporazumi o Nilu, stečena 
prava, vodna sigurnost
